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The Priority Review Voucher Program at the FDA: 
From Neglected Tropical Diseases to the 21st 
Century Cures Act 
Ana Santos Rutschman* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The priority review voucher program at the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) was established in 2007 to incentivize research and development 
(R&D) in traditionally underfunded diseases.1 While shrouded in controversy 
and criticism, the program has recently been bolstered by the passage of the 
21st Century Cures Act,2 which prevented the vouchers from sunsetting in 
late 2016 and furthered the overall scope of the program.3 As it reaches the 
end of its first decade, this Article discusses the impact of the program, with 
a focus on recent developments. The Article builds on literature suggesting 
that the voucher program has been ineffective in incentivizing research in 
neglected diseases. It is the first to consider the expansion of the vouchers to 
cover R&D on Ebola and Zika, arguing that the expansion was attributable 
to misguided bipartisan political support and is likely to result in further 
cross-subsidization benefiting R&D on mainstream diseases. Finally, this is 
also the first scholarly piece to describe and assess the likely impact the 21st 
Century Cares Act has on the program. 
The process of developing and getting regulatory approval for a drug is 
especially costly.4 The default mechanism for incentivizing innovation in 
 
*  Jaharis Faculty Fellow in Health Law and Intellectual Property, DePaul University College 
of Law. For helpful comments, I would like to thank Wendy Netter Epstein, Sam Halabi, 
Katherine Macfarlane, Josh Sarnoff and Nadia Sawicki, as well as the participants in the Tenth 
Annual Symposium on Health Law & Policy at Loyola University Chicago School of Law. 
All errors remain my own. 
1.  Ridley et al., infra note 16, at 313; Priority Review Vouchers: Overview, 
http://priorityreviewvoucher.org/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). 
2.  Jennifer Steinhauer & Robert Pear, Sweeping Health Measure, Backed by Obama, 
Passes Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07/us/politics/21st-century-cures-act-senate.html?_r=0. 
3.  Infra, Part IV.A.1. 
4.  A 2015 study puts this number at as high as $2.56 billion. See TUFTS UNIV., CTR. FOR 
THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV., OUTLOOK 2015, 3 (2015), 
http://csdd.tufts.edu/files/uploads/Outlook-2015.pdf [hereinafter TUFTS]. This might be an 
overestimation. There is however no consensus on what the exact figures are, and the numbers 
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capital-intensive areas is the patent system, which has consistently been 
regarded and lobbied for as a sine qua non of pharmaceutical innovation.5 
But even the ability to set monopolistic prices for on-patent drugs is of little 
avail in certain areas.6 The patent model reinforces the tendency of 
pharmaceutical companies to focus R&D on drugs destined for markets with 
“attractive investment returns.”7 Diseases that, in spite of a high social cost 
and medical burden, affect small populations or that primarily affect 
populations with limited resources receive scant R&D attention.8 
However, other organizations and governmental agencies have provided 
additional research incentives in the form of grants, exclusivities, vouchers, 
and tax credits.9 For example, the FDA administers the priority review 
voucher program. Congress designed the program and similar incentives to 
help cure market failures in pharmaceutical innovation when patent 
incentives alone are insufficient. The design of the program, however, is 
idiosyncratic. The FDA awards vouchers to drug sponsors who obtain 
regulatory approval for drugs treating qualifying, underfunded diseases.10 
Sponsors can redeem vouchers to speed up the approval process for a separate 
drug application.11 The vouchers help sponsors get their drugs on the market 
faster and, in turn, collect larger profits.12 
Critics argue that the program fails to generate the type of innovative R&D 
it purports to foster or to ensure the affordability of—and access to—drugs 
approved under the program.13 Nevertheless, from a political point of view it 
has cyclically enjoyed the bipartisan support that is so elusive nowadays, and 
 
will vary according to type of drug or therapy. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy 
Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1581, 1616, 1676 (2003) (noting how the “precise 
statistics” of the costs associated with pharmaceutical R&D remain disputed). 
5.  See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 346 (2007) (noting the role of the pharmaceutical industry 
in perpetuating a patent-based system for drug innovation: “[t]he pharmaceutical industry, 
lobbying for stronger patent laws throughout the world, has sung the praises of the patent 
system as a means of promoting costly and risky investments in research and development 
(‘R&D’).”). 
6.  Ezekiel Emanuel, Don’t Only Blame Mylan for $600 EpiPens, FORTUNE INSIDERS 
(Sept. 8, 2016), https://insiders.fortune.com/dont-only-blame-mylan-for-600-epipens-
6ad0065373e0#.p3gwrms23. 
7.  TUFTS, supra note 4, at 3. 
8.  Ridley et al., infra note 16, at 313. 
9.   See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes 
Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013) (discussing the role of tax incentives in innovation policy); 
Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 999 (2014) (discussing the government’s various rewards for innovation). 
10.  See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the FDA’s voucher program as an incentives 
mechanism). 
11.  See infra Part II.A.1 (explaining the R&D incentive of “blockbuster drug” sales). 
12.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
13.  See infra Part II.A.2.b. 
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was legislatively expanded over time in both scope and duration.14 Moreover, 
Congress recently passed the 21st Century Cures Act, which provides funding 
for early-stage and “high-risk, high-reward” biomedical research and further 
expands the priority review voucher program.15 
Part I of the Article introduces the voucher program in the context of 
innovation policy. Part II surveys the genesis, growth and shortcomings of 
the program. Part III shows how the expansion of the program—following 
the recent Ebola and Zika outbreaks, and into new fields—accentuates 
misalignments between the vouchers and R&D incentives strategies. Part IV 
explores the future of the program as affected by recent legislative changes, 
as well as the emerging role of the FDA as a catalyst for innovation policy as 
dictated by the voucher program. 
II. THE FDA’S VOUCHER PROGRAM AS AN INCENTIVES 
MECHANISM 
A. The Priority Review Voucher Program 
1. The Voucher Program in the Context of Incentives Mechanisms 
David Ridley, Henry Grabowski, and Jeffrey Moe first proposed the 
priority review voucher program in Health Affairs article in 2006.16 The 
catalyst for the proposal was the generalized lack of medicines available to 
patients with infectious and parasitic diseases in the developing world.17 The 
authors suggest that the FDA could be the touchstone of an incentives scheme 
that would have pharmaceutical companies self-fund increased R&D in 
 
14.  See infra Part III. 
15.  See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub.L. No. 114 – 255, § 2036 (2016) [hereinafter 21st 
Century Cures Act]; see also Elaine Schattner, Why Patients Support the 21st Century Cures 
Act, FORBES (Nov. 30, 2016, 9:54 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/elaineschattner/2016/11/30/why-patients-support-the-21st-
century-cures-act/#9143ceaac373 (citing funding for Precision Medicine Initiative and the 
Cancer Moonshot as one of the main reasons for supporting the 21st Century Cures Act). 
While both initiatives have been regarded favorably by patient advocacy groups and the 
general public, the potential and actual efficacy of the Precision Medicine Initiative and the 
Cancer Moonshot has been contested. Tabitha M. Powledge, That ‘Precision Medicine’ 
Initiative? A Reality Check, GENETIC LITERACY PROJECT (Feb. 3, 2015), 
https://www.geneticliteracyproject.org/2015/02/03/that-precision-medicine-initiative-a-
reality-check/; Jamie Condliffe, The Best—and Worst—Things About Joe Biden’s Cancer 
Moonshot, TECH. REV. (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602679/the-
best-and-worst-things-about-joe-bidens-cancer-moonshot/. 
16.  David B. Ridley et al., Developing Drugs for Developing Countries, 25 HEALTH AFF. 
313, 313 (2006). 
17.  Id. For a discussion of the market failures surrounding R&D for neglected diseases, 
see Patrice Trouiller et al., Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: A Deficient Market and 
A Public-Health Policy Failure, 359 THE LANCET 2188, 218891 (2002). 
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neglected tropical diseases.18 
With most companies engage in pharmaceutical R&D in the developed 
world, particularly in the United States and Europe,19 Ridley et alia reasoned 
that a way to bolster the development and commercialization of new drugs 
and therapies for tropical diseases would be to tie the incentives for orphan 
drugs to strategic and financial benefits for “blockbuster” drugs which 
receive most funding for R&D. The scheme would partially add to R&D 
funding for diseases prevalent in economically unattractive markets (the 
markets of the developing world) from the traditional patent-based model in 
which innovator companies recoup R&D costs through the sale of drugs 
priced for more affluent populations.20 
To implement the program in the United States, Congress created a list of 
voucher-eligible diseases.21 When the sponsor of an eligible drug obtains 
FDA approval, a voucher is issued granting “priority review” to a second 
drug for which the sponsor might seek regulatory approval at a later time.22 
Under standard review, the FDA takes around ten months23 to review and 
either grant or deny approval of new drugs and therapies.24 When a priority 
 
18.  Ridley et al., supra note 16, at 313. 
19.  Andrew Witty, New Strategies for Innovation in Global Health: A Pharmaceutical 
Industry Perspective, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 118, 124 (2011). The Ridley et al. paper suggested the 
adoption of a similar mechanism for Europe and, in 2011, David Ridley & Afonso Calles 
Sánchez specifically described and proposed a European priority review voucher system. 
David B. Ridley & Alfonso Calles Sánchez, Introduction of European Priority Review 
Vouchers to Encourage Development of New Medicines for Neglected Diseases, 376 THE 
LANCET 922, 922 (2010). 
20.  See Ridley et al., supra note 16, at 315 (describing the proposal’s goal to create a 
market for financially “unattractive” diseases). 
21.  See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing drug affordability). 
22.  Gaffney et al., infra note 34. 
23.  See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR 
SERIOUS CONDITIONS – DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS 25 (2014), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/UCM358301.pdf (comparing the FDA’s 
expedited goal to action within six months of receiving the application with its standard ten-
month framework) [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY]; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 6 (2016), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidan
ces/ucm080599.pdf (stating, “FDA commits to a goal to review and act on 90 percent of 
standard applications for N[ew] M[olecular] E[ntity] and original B[iologics] L[icense] 
A[pplications] submissions within 10 months of the 60-day filing date.”) [hereinafter 
TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS]. 
24.  Average review times also vary depending on type of drug and drug complexity. A 
2014 study examined review times at FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
(“CDER”) and found “wide variance” among divisions, with Oncology and Antivirals 
approving new drugs approximately three times quicker than the agency’s least efficient 
divisions. Oncology and Antivirals took on average under 200 days to approve a new drug, 
whereas the slowest division, Neurology, took close to 600 days. JOSEPH A. DIMASI ET AL., 
AN FDA REPORT CARD: WIDE VARIANCE IN PERFORMANCE FOUND AMONG AGENCY’S DRUG 
REVIEW DIVISIONS 6, 8 (2014). 
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review voucher is redeemed, the agency must attempt to bring that period 
down to six months.25 Pharmaceutical companies benefiting from a voucher 
are therefore able to enter the market four months earlier, reaping the 
corresponding financial gains.26 The incentive to engage in R&D for 
neglected diseases thus materializes in the form of sales of a second 
(potentially blockbuster) drug.27 Short as this window of time may seem, for 
the pharmaceutical industry, “four months of earlier market access could 
translate into hundreds of millions of dollars.”28 
In addition to the possibility of direct use, Ridley et alia suggested that the 
vouchers should be transferable.29 As an alternative to entering the market 
ahead of time, a voucher holder would be allowed to transfer or sell it to 
another company.30 In the first iteration of the program, Congress chose to 
restrict the number of times a voucher could be transferred, but the law was 
amended to remove that limitation in 2014.31 To date there have been five 
confirmed sales, ranging from $67 to $350 million.32 
The combined transfers and sales of vouchers that have occurred since the 
program was implemented in the United States provide an idea of the de facto 
economic value of the vouchers. By extension, they should also help 
delineate the profile of the incentive for companies to engage in R&D in 
voucher-qualifying areas. For instance, Praluent, an injectable cholesterol-
lowering treatment, and Odefsey, used to treat HIV-1 infections, have entered 
the market with a voucher.33 In both cases, the voucher had been acquired 
 
25.  See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FAST TRACK, BREAKTHROUGH THERAPY, 
ACCELERATED APPROVAL, PRIORITY REVIEW, 
http://www.fda.gov/forpatients/approvals/fast/ucm20041766.htm (last updated Sept. 14, 
2015) [hereinafter FAST TRACK] (“A Priority Review designation means FDA’s goal is to take 
action on an application within 6 months.”). 
26.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA’S EFFORTS ON RARE AND NEGLECTED DISEASES: 
HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON AGRIC., RURAL DEV., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., AND 
RELATED AGENCIES, COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE 6 (2010), 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA16/20130627/101069/HHRG-113-FA16-Wstate-
GoodmanJ-20130627.pdf [hereinafter HEARING] (recording the statement of Jessie L. 
Goodman, Chief Scientist and Deputy Commissioner for Science and Public Health, Food and 
Drug Administration). 
27.  Id. 
28.  FDA’s Efforts on Rare and Neglected Diseases, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, 
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm216991.htm (last updated June 23, 2010). 
29.  Ridley et al., supra note 16, at 322. 
30.  Id. at 317. 
31.  See infra Part III.B. 
32.  Infra Table 1. 
33.  FDA Approves Praluent to Treat Certain Patients with High Cholesterol, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN. (July 24, 2015), 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm455883.htm; Gilead 
Sciences, Gilead Sciences Says U.S. FDA Approves Odefsey, REUTERS (Mar 1, 2016, 2:16 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSASC08EH3. 
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from another company.34 In order to expedite review of Praluent, Sanofi 
acquired the voucher from BioMarin at a price tag of $67 million, which 
indicates that Sanofi expected returns in excess of that amount.35 In the case 
of Odefsey, Gilead obtained the voucher from Knight Therapeutics for $125 
million, which puts the estimated return over $130 million.36 Likewise, the 
record-setting transaction in which United sold a (so-far unused) voucher to 
AbbVie for $350 million indicates that, in the future, AbbVie expects to gain 
approval for a drug that is likely to generate more than that amount after 
entering the market four months ahead of standard review.37 
 
Year Seller Purchaser Amount 
2014 BioMarin Sanofi and Regeneron $67 million 
2014 Knight  Gilead $125 million 
2015 United  AbbVie $350 million 
2015 Retrophin Sanofi $245 million 
2016 Unknown38 Gilead undisclosed 
 
Table 1: Priority Review Voucher Sales 
 
FDA’s mission of ensuring the safety and efficacy of drugs39 is unlikely to 
be compromised by the redemption of a voucher per se, as the agency 
routinely engages in processes to expedite review of drugs deemed promising 
outside the voucher context.40 The agency has different pathways to speed up 
review of drugs that treat “serious medical conditions,” particularly in cases 
where such drugs “are the first available treatment or if the drug has 
 
34.  Alexander Gaffney et al., Regulatory Explainer: Everything You Need to Know About 
FDA’s Priority Review Vouchers, REG. AFF. PROF’LS SOC’Y (Nov. 3, 2016), 
http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2015/07/02/21722/Regulatory-Explainer-
Everything-You-Need-to-Know-About-FDA%E2%80%99s-Priority-Review-Vouchers/. 
35.  Id. (explaining that Sanofi expects returns in addition to the voucher user fee). 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. 
38.  In July of 2016, Gilead indicated that it had purchased a voucher, but did not make 
public any information about the sale or plans for its use. See GILEAD SCIENCES, INC., CURRENT 
REPORT (FORM 8-K) (July 25, 2016), 
http://investors.gilead.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=69964&p=irol-
SECText&TEXT=aHR0cDovL2FwaS50ZW5rd2l6YXJkLmNvbS9maWxpbmcueG1sP2lw
YWdlPTExMDUwOTAzJkRTRVE9MCZTRVE9MCZTUURFU0M9U0VDVElPTl9FTlRJ
UkUmc3Vic2lkPTU3. Some commentators have raised the possibility that this might be the 
voucher awarded earlier in 2016 to vaccine company PaxVax Bermuda for Vaxchora, a single-
dose oral cholera vaccine. See Gaffney et al, supra note 34. 
39.  See What We Do: FDA Mission, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/ (last updated Apr. 4, 2017). 
40.  See GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 23, at 1; see also infra note 41 and 
accompanying text. 
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advantages over existing treatments.”41 One of these pathways is known as 
“priority review” and was created in 1992 by the Prescription Drug User Fee 
Act.42 When a drug is granted priority review status, the FDA directs its 
“overall attention and resources” to reviewing the application.43 In practice, 
this translates into a shortening of the average review period from ten to six 
months.44 The voucher program inscribes certain drug applications into an 
existing category—priority review—for which these drugs might not have 
otherwise qualified. 
Although engaging in priority review is by now a routine process for the 
FDA,45 shifting to priority review upon redemption of a voucher does have 
an impact on the agency, which has been plagued by funding and staff 
shortcomings since well before the voucher system was devised.46 In the 
2006 paper introducing the concept of priority review vouchers, Ridley et 
alia estimated that the “cost to the FDA of changing a drug’s status from 
standard to priority is approximately $1 million” and proposed a voucher user 
 
41.  See FAST TRACK, supra note 25; For Patients: Breakthrough Therapy, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/forpatients/approvals/fast/ucm405397.htm (last updated 
September 15, 2014) (Sponsors of drugs that “treat serious conditions and fill an unmet 
medical need” may request fast track designation. Sponsors of drugs treating serious 
conditions may request breakthrough therapy designation “when preliminary clinical 
evidence indicates that the drug may demonstrate substantial improvement over available 
therapy on a clinically significant endpoint(s).” Accelerated approval is available “for drugs 
for serious conditions that fill an unmet medical need on whether the drug has an effect on a 
surrogate or an intermediate clinical endpoint.”). As indicated above, priority review sets “a 
goal date for taking action on an application within 6 months of receipt.” U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., REVIEW DESIGNATION POLICY: PRIORITY (P) AND STANDARD (S), MANUAL OF 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 2 (2013), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/StaffPoliciesandProcedu
res/ucm082000.pdf [hereinafter P AND S POLICY MANUAL]. 
42.  Id.; See also Ernst R. Berndt et al., Industry Funding of the FDA: Effects of PDUFA 
on Approval Times and Withdrawal Rates, 4 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 545, 546 (July 
2005). 
43.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PRIORITY REVIEW, 
http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Fast/ucm405405.htm (last updated Sep. 15, 2014). 
44.  P AND S POLICY MANUAL, supra note 41, at 2. 
45.  See Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, Economics of New Oncology Drug 
Development, 25 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 210, 216 (Jan. 2007) (discussing a 2007 study that 
found that 71% of approved oncology drugs had received priority review, whereas for other 
drugs the rate was 40%); John K. Jenkins, Regulatory Flexibility and Lessons Learned: Drugs 
for Rare Diseases, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 12 (Oct. 18, 2016), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTob
acco/CDER/UCM525805.pdf (showing that during the 2008-2016 period (up to September 7, 
2016) the number of NMEs approved under priority review was 75% for rare diseases and 
30% for non-rare diseases). 
46.  See, e.g., Charles Marwick, FDA Funding Problems Imperil Safety of Biological 
Products in the United States, 279 JAMA 899, 901 (1998) (discussing the disparity between 
the increase between the number of areas FDA has been called to regulate over time and the 
amount of funding available to the agency). 
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fee that would match or surpass that amount.47 For fiscal year 2017 the fee 
has been set at $2,706,000 for all types of vouchers.48 
Even if the user fee can compensate for the economic cost associated with 
granting priority review in cases where the FDA might otherwise have denied 
that status, it is still not enough to dispel all concerns about the impact the 
program might have on the agency. These concerns are especially salient with 
regard to autonomy in its agenda-setting, as described in Part IV.49 
In spite of potential direct and indirect costs, the voucher program quickly 
gathered political support.50 Senator Sam Brownback spearheaded the 
incorporation of the program into the Food and Drug Administration 
Amendments Act (FDAAA), which was signed into law on September 27, 
2007, a mere year and a half after the concept of the vouchers was first 
introduced in a scientific publication.51 A second voucher program was 
created in 2012, covering rare pediatric diseases, and the recently approved 
21st Century Cures Act introduced a third voucher program, covering drugs 
used to respond to bioterrorism or natural disasters (commonly known as 
medical countermeasures).52 
2. Development of the Voucher Program 
The priority review voucher program was created in 2007 “to stimulate 
new drug development” in neglected tropical diseases.53 Eligible tropical 
diseases are defined by a closed list, which originally encompassed 16 
diseases, including tuberculosis, malaria, cholera and Human African 
 
47.  See Ridley et al., supra note 16, at 315, 318. 
48.  But see Zachary Brennan, Priority Review Voucher Fees to Decline in FY 2017, REG. 
AFFS. PROF’LS SOC’Y (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-
Focus/News/2016/09/29/25926/Priority-Review-Voucher-Fees-to-Decline-in-FY-2017/ 
(providing a comparison of 2016 to 2017 noting the decrease in fees for priority vouchers). 
This is actually a decrease from FY 2016, in which the fee was set at $2,727,000. In 2011, the 
fee for vouchers for tropical diseases was set at $4,582,000, rising to $5,280,000 in 2012 and 
then declining to $3,559,000 in 2013. When pediatric disease vouchers were introduced (see 
infra note 66) the fee was set to match the tropical disease fee at $2,325,000 in 2014, and there 
has been fee parity for both programs ever since. 
49.  See infra Part IV. 
50.  See Sam Brownback, Eliminating Neglected Diseases: Impact of Published Paper, 
26 HEALTH AFFS. 1505, 1509 (2007) (offering Senator Brownback’s support of a priority 
review voucher program in Congress). 
51.  Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 1102, 
121 Stat. 823 (2007). 
52.  What are Medical Countermeasures?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/EmergencyPreparedness/Counterterrorism/MedicalCountermeasures/A
boutMCMi/ucm431268.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2017); see also infra Part III.B. 
53.  Gaffney et al., supra note 34 (noting that section 1102 of the FDAAA created the l
Neglected Tropical Disease Voucher System). 
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trypanosomiasis (commonly known as sleeping sickness).54 As detailed in 
Part III, Ebola and Zika were not part of the initial list. The FDA has the 
authority to add “[a]ny other infectious disease for which there is no 
significant market in developed nations and that disproportionately affects 
poor and marginalized populations,”55 a prerogative that the agency first used 
in August 2015 to add Chagas and neurocysticercosis to the neglected 
tropical disease voucher program.56 At the time, the FDA also created a 
docket for public recommendations for further additions to the list.57 
Additionally, the statute gives the FDA the authority to enforce 
requirements and limitations on the use of vouchers. During the first seven 
years of the program, the statute required drug sponsors to notify the FDA at 
least 365 days before redeeming a priority voucher, a period that was 
shortened in 2014 to a minimum of 90 days.58 Initially, transfers of vouchers 
were also limited and could only take place once. In 2008, the FDA clarified 
that “contractual arrangements such as the use of an option or transfer of the 
right to designate the voucher’s recipient” were within the terms of the 
statute.59 Since 2014, there have been no limits to the number of times a 
voucher may be transferred,60 but a letter of transfer is required.61 
The tropical disease vouchers may be used in combination with other 
incentives initiatives or programs. For instance, a drug might qualify 
simultaneously for the voucher and for orphan drug designation,62 which 
would make it eligible for “marketing exclusivity and tax credits for qualified 
clinical testing,” as well certain fee exemptions.63 
 
54.  21 U.S.C. § 360n(a)(3). 
55.  TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 4. 
56.  Designating Additions to the Current List of Tropical Diseases in Section 1102 of the 
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 50559, 50559–65 (Aug. 25, 
2015) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. p. 317), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-08-
20/pdf/2015-20554.pdf [hereinafter Additions to Tropical Diseases]. 
57.  DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA-2008-N-0567 
(Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/FDA-2008-N-0567-nhc.pdf. 
58.  21 U.S.C. § 360n(b)(4). 
59.  TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 5. 
60.  21 U.S.C. § 360n(b)(2); see also TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS 
GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 8 (explaining the FD&C Act and modifications). 
61.  TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 8. 
62.  Aarti Sharma et al., Orphan Drug: Development Trends and Strategies, 2 J. 
PHARMACY & BIOALLIED SCI. 290, 291 (2010), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2996062/ 
(An orphan drug can be defined as “is one that has been developed specifically to treat a rare 
medical condition, the condition itself being referred to as ‘orphan disease.’”); see also 21 
U.S.C. § 360bb (explaining voucher designation for rare diseases by the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services). 
63.  TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 10; 21 
U.S.C. § 335a(o)(2)(a). 
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So far, the FDA has awarded four vouchers for neglected tropical diseases. 
The 2012 voucher awarded to Janssen (Johnson & Johnson) for Sirturo,64 a 
bedaquiline-based drug used to treat multidrug-resistant pulmonary 
tuberculosis, was the first tuberculosis drug to receive FDA approval in 40 
years.65 
 
Year Company Qualifying disease 
2009 Novartis malaria 
2012 Janssen (J&) tuberculosis 
2014 Knight 
Therapeutics 
leishmaniasis 
2016 PaxVax Bermuda cholera 
 
Table 2: Priority review vouchers awarded for neglected tropical diseases, 2007-
2016 
 
Five years after the neglected tropical disease program was created, 
Section 529 of the FDCA introduced a similar voucher-based incentives 
program for rare pediatric diseases.66 FDCA defines rare pediatric disease as 
one that “primarily affects individuals aged from birth to 18 years,”67 and an 
FDA guidance on the pediatric voucher program further clarifies that a drug 
qualifies for a pediatric voucher “if the entire prevalence of the disease or 
condition in the U.S. is below 200,000 and if more than 50% of patients with 
the disease are 0 through 18 years of age.”68 
From the start, sponsors of qualifying pediatric drugs were required to 
notify the FDA 90 days before using the voucher, and the transfer of pediatric 
vouchers was never subject to limitations, as was initially the case with 
tropical diseases.69 Pediatric vouchers may be used in conjunction with other 
 
64.  Press Release, Johnson & Johnson, FDA Grants Accelerated Approval for 
SIRTURO™ (Bedaquiline) as Part of Combination Therapy to Treat Adults with Pulmonary 
Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.jnj.com/media-center/press-
releases/fda-grants-accelerated-approval-for-sirturo-bedaquiline-as-part-of-combination-
therapy-to-treat-adults-with-pulmonary-multi-drug-resistant-tuberculosis. 
65.  See Katie Thomas, F.D.A. Approves Drug for Resistant Tuberculosis, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/01/business/fda-approves-new-
tuberculosis-drug.html (discussing the FDA’s approval for Situro as a new treatment for multi-
drug resistance tuberculosis). 
66.  21 U.S.C. § 360ff. 
67.  21 U.S.C. § 360ff(a)(3). 
68.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RARE PEDIATRIC DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS, 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, 3 (2014), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM423325.pdf 
[hereinafter PEDIATRIC VOUCHER GUIDANCE]. 
69.  21 U.S.C. § 360ff. 
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incentives programs.70 
A distinctive feature of the pediatric voucher program was that it gave the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) a year counting from the 
awarding of the third rare pediatric disease priority voucher to “conduct a 
study of the effectiveness” of the program.71 Specifically, GAO was to report 
on: 
(i) The indications for which each rare disease product for which a priority 
review voucher was awarded (…); 
(ii) Whether, and to what extent, an unmet need related to the treatment or 
prevention of a rare pediatric disease was met through the approval of such 
a rare disease product; 
(iii) The value of the priority review voucher if transferred; 
(iv) Identification of each drug for which a priority review voucher was 
used; 
(v) The length of the period of time between the date on which a priority 
review voucher was awarded and the date on which it was used.72 
So far, seven vouchers have been awarded for rare pediatric diseases, at a 
rate that is five times higher than the one for neglected tropical diseases. 
 
Year Company Qualifying disease 
2014 BioMarin Morquio A syndrome 
2015 United Therapeutics High-risk neuroblastoma 
2015 Asklepion Pharma Bile acid synthesis disorder 
2015 Wellstat 
Therapeutics 
Hereditary orotic aciduria 
2015 Alexion 
Pharmaceuticals 
Hypophosphatasia 
2015 Alexion 
Pharmaceuticals 
Lysosomal acid lipase 
deficiency 
2016 Sarepta Duchenne muscular 
dystrophy 
 
Table 3: Priority review vouchers awarded for rare pediatric diseases, 2012-2016 
 
70.  21 U.S.C. § 360ff(g); see also PEDIATRIC VOUCHER GUIDANCE, supra note 68, at 1–2 
(discussing how as with the tropical disease vouchers, diseases qualifying for pediatric 
vouchers may cumulatively qualify for orphan drug designation and corresponding benefits). 
71.  21 U.S.C. § 360ff(i)(A); see also infra Part II.B. 
72.  21 U.S.C. § 360ff(i)(B). 
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The original sunset provision established that the pediatric voucher 
program would come to an end one year after the FDA issued the third 
voucher for a rare pediatric disease.73 That third voucher was granted to 
Asklepion on March 17, 2015 for Cholbam, a drug that treats patients lacking 
enzymes to synthesize bile acid.74 In January 2016, Congress reauthorized 
the program through September 201675 and a second short-term 
reauthorization prolonged it until December 31, 2016.76 The 21st Century 
Cures Act now extends the program until 2020.77 Drugs receiving rare 
pediatric designation before October 1, 2020, will be eligible for a voucher if 
approved before October 1, 2022.78 
B. Criticism of the Voucher Program 
In theory, the revenue generated, either by direct redemption or sale of a 
priority review voucher, functions as a reward in areas where traditional 
incentives—such as patents—have failed to generate substantial innovation. 
The prize-like benefit is justified as a mechanism to incentivize costly R&D 
in areas with small disease populations, rendering them attractive to 
pharmaceutical companies who would otherwise avoid markets that offer few 
prospects of covering their investment. The particular appeal of the voucher 
system is that, unlike other types of incentives,79 vouchers do not require any 
direct financial support from the government or tax-based contributions. As 
seen in the previous section, this feature renders them politically attractive 
and has helped extend the life of the program. 
To accomplish its goals,80 the voucher program must however produce two 
interlinked yet distinct outcomes: 1) pharmaceutical companies should invest 
in R&D for neglected and/or rare diseases as a direct result of the voucher 
 
73.  21 U.S.C. § 360ff(b)(5) (“TERMINATION OF AUTHORITY.— The Secretary may 
not award any priority review vouchers under paragraph (1) after the last day of the 1-year 
period that begins on the date that the Secretary awards the third rare pediatric disease priority 
voucher under this section.”). 
74.  See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Cholbam to Treat Rare 
Bile Acid Synthesis Disorders (Mar. 17, 2015), 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm438572.htm 
(explaining rare bile acid synthesis disorders and the hoped effect Cholbam will have on them). 
75.  Advancing Hope Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-229, § 1878, 130 Stat. 943, 946 (2016). 
76.  Press Release, Kids V Cancer, President Obama Signs the Advancing Hope Act to 
Extend the Creating Hope Act to December 31, 2016 (Sept. 30, 2016), 
http://www.kidsvcancer.org/president-obama-signs-the-advancing-hope-act-to-extend-the-
creating-hope-act-to-december-31-2016/. 
77.  21st Century Cures Act, § 2152. 
78.  Id. 
79.  Ouellette & Hemel, supra note 9, at 1008. 
80.  See TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS, supra note 23; see also Ridley 
et al., supra note 16. 
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incentive; and 2) if approved by the FDA, drugs and therapies for the diseases 
targeted by the program should be made available to patients at prices they 
can afford. Early evidence from the two existing types of vouchers suggests 
that the current design of the program might not be conducive to achieving 
either of these outcomes. 
So far, there is a single formal evaluation of the vouchers—focusing only 
on rare pediatric diseases—and that evaluation has contributed little to a 
comprehensive assessment of the vouchers as incentives. Pursuant to 21 
U.S.C. § 360ff(i)(A),81 in March 2016 the GAO issued a report that bears the 
most self-explanatory of titles: Rare Diseases – Too Early to Gauge 
Effectiveness of FDA’s Pediatric Voucher Program.82 The report raises 
important questions, especially with regard to the effect of the program on 
the FDA.83 The Agency expressed the view that the program: 
adversely affects the agency’s ability to set its public health priorities by 
requiring FDA to provide priority reviews of new drug applications that 
would not otherwise qualify if they do not treat a serious condition or 
provide a significant improvement in safety or effectiveness. Additionally, 
FDA officials said that the additional workload from the program strains 
the agency’s resources.84 
However, the main conclusion of the report is that, given the extended life 
cycle of drug R&D, the then 3-year-old pediatric voucher program had yet to 
generate enough evidence to accurately assess whether the vouchers were 
“encouraging the development of drugs for rare pediatric diseases.”85 
In contrast with the findings of the report, commentators have been more 
overt in criticizing the voucher program, in both of its current iterations.86 By 
now, sufficient empirical evidence has emerged that it is possible to identify 
and analyze trends shared by the pediatric and the tropical disease programs. 
These trends suggest that it is unlikely that the vouchers are accomplishing 
the goals for which they were designed. The following sections examine the 
two-fold criticism of the program, starting with the problem of incentives to 
increased R&D in voucher-eligible areas, and then turning to the question of 
 
81.  21 U.S.C. 360ff(i)(1)(A). 
82.  See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-319, RARE DISEASES: TOO 
EARLY TO GAUGE EFFECTIVENESS OF FDA PEDIATRIC VOUCHER PROGRAM (Mar. 2, 2016), 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-319 [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
83.  Id. 
84.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HIGHLIGHTS OF GAO-16-319, A REPORT TO 
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-319 
[hereinafter HIGHLIGHTS OF GAO-16-319]. 
85.  GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 9. 
86.  See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim, Drug Development for Neglected Diseases — The 
Trouble with FDA Review Vouchers, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1981, 1981 (2008). 
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availability of affordable drugs approved under the existing voucher 
programs. 
1. Lack of R&D in Voucher-eligible Diseases 
In April 2009, the FDA granted Novartis a tropical disease voucher (and 
the first-ever priority voucher) for Coartem, an artemisinin-based 
combination therapy for malaria.87 Artemisinin combination therapies are 
consensually regarded as “generally highly effective and well tolerated” and 
are the standard treatment recommend by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) for uncomplicated malaria.88 When Novartis sought regulatory 
approval for Coartem in the U.S., the drug had been in use for close to a 
decade and was already registered in 85 other countries.89 Novartis stated that 
it had been considering registering the drug in the U.S. before the creation of 
the vouchers, citing “pressure from the U.S. Government and army to supply 
traveling American citizens” as the main reason for registering the drug.90 
Similarly, in March 2014, Knight Therapeutics was awarded a neglected 
tropical disease voucher after obtaining regulatory approval for Impavido, a 
miltefosine-based drug used in the treatment of leishmaniasis.91 The bulk of 
miltefosine R&D took place during the 1990s with funding from the WHO 
and other institutions.92 Knight Therapeutics, while never involved in the 
R&D process, went on to sell the voucher to Gilead for $125 million.93 These 
two examples illustrate the disjointed dynamics of the program, with the 
incentive-benefit being appropriated by players that do not engage in drug-
related R&D.94 
 
87.  Tatum Anderson, Novartis Under Fire for Accepting New Reward for Old Drug, 373 
THE LANCET 1414, 1414 (2009). 
88.  See WORLD HEALTH ORG., GUIDELINES FOR THE TREATMENT OF MALARIA THIRD 
EDITION 16 (2015), 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/162441/1/9789241549127_eng.pdf. 
89.  See Anderson, supra note 87, at 1414. 
90.  See id. 
91.  Press Release, Knight Therapeutics, Inc., Knight Therapeutics, Inc., Announces FDA 
Approval for Impavido (Miltefosine) for the Treatment of Visceral, Mucosal and Cutaneous 
Leishmaniasis – Awarded Priority Review Voucher (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.gud-
knight.com/en/knight-therapeutics-inc-announces-fda-approval-for-impavido-miltefosine-
for-the-treatment-of-visceral-mucosal-and-cutaneous-leishmaniasis-awarded-priority-
review-voucher. 
92.  Bernard Pécoul & Manica Balasegaram, FDA Voucher for Leishmaniasis Treatment: 
Can Both Patients and Companies Win?, PLOS BLOGS (Jan. 20, 2015), 
http://blogs.plos.org/speakingofmedicine/2015/01/20/fda-voucher-leishmaniasis-treatment-
can-patients-companies-win/. 
93.  Press Release, Knight Therapeutics, Inc., Knight Sells Priority Review Voucher to 
Gilead (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.gud-knight.com/en/knight-sells-priority-review-voucher-
to-gilead. 
94.  Focusing exclusively on the pediatric vouchers, GAO has found that “each of the 
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Signs that the industry is planning to reinvest voucher-money on R&D for 
tropical or rare pediatric diseases are tentative at best. When interviewed 
during the course of the pediatric program evaluation, representatives of 
pharmaceutical companies that made money from the sale of a voucher told 
GAO that they planned “to reinvest portions of the proceeds they received 
into additional research on rare pediatric diseases.”95 However, all available 
evidence indicates that drug sponsors are not investing in innovative R&D 
for voucher-eligible diseases, but rather acquiring fully developed drugs and 
bringing them to the FDA for review.96 To be sure, these companies still bear 
the non-negligible costs of acquiring the drugs and of regulatory review, but 
these are not the types of costs that the voucher program was designed to 
cover. As per current practice, the program is subsidizing the non-negligible, 
yet modest costs (by pharmaceutical industry standards) of bringing existing 
drugs into the United States market. And, since there is no requirement that 
voucher-money be used to fund R&D on voucher-eligible diseases, the drugs 
so far approved through voucher priority review do not target niche or 
underfunded areas.97 
2. Drug Affordability 
Even if we were to settle for a system of vouchers that merely brings 
existing drugs into the United States market, the no-strings-attached design 
 
drugs awarded pediatric vouchers were in development prior to the voucher program’s 
implementation. Any sponsors motivated by this relatively new program to attempt to develop 
drugs for such diseases would likely be years away from submitting their new drug 
applications to FDA.” GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 9–10. 
95.  GAO REPORT, supra note 82. 
96.  Id. 
97.  In 2011, Novartis unsuccessfully redeemed the voucher it was awarded for its 
combination therapy for malaria.  The company used the voucher to speed up review of a 
biologics license application for Ilaris, a canakinumab-based treatment for gouty arthritis.  The 
Arthritis Drugs Advisory Committee at the FDA voted 11-1 against approving the drug.  
Following voucher redemptions fared better; in 2015, Sanofi used a voucher and obtained 
approval of Praluent, which is used to treat high cholesterol levels; in 2016, Gilead used a 
voucher and obtained approval for Odefsey, used in HIV-1 infections; and also in 2016, Sanofi 
again used a voucher and obtained approval for Soliqua, a combination therapy used in adults 
with type 2 diabetes.  All three drugs approved through a priority review voucher thus target 
chronic and mainstream diseases. See Kurt R. Karst, Priority Review Vouchers – Not Much 
Bang for The Buck, FDA LAW BLOG (July 11, 2011), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2011/07/priority-review-vouchers-
not-much-bang-for-the-buck.html; Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves 
Praluent to Treat Certain Patients with High Cholesterol (July 24, 2015), 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm455883.htm; and 
Press Release, Sanofi, Sanofi Receives FDA Approval of Soliqua 100/33 for the Treatment of 
Adults with Type 2 Diabetes (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.news.sanofi.us/2016-11-21-Sanofi-
Receives-FDA-Approval-of-Soliqua-100-33-for-the-Treatment-of-Adults-with-Type-2-
Diabetes. 
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of the voucher program produces yet another undesirable result; there is no 
law that ensures that voucher-redeemed drugs will become available to 
patients at affordable prices.98 In the 2006 paper, Ridley et alia submitted that 
“the incentive mechanism has little value if treatments are developed that do 
not reach patients. The developer should work with global and local 
stakeholders prior to FDA approval to ensure that the product will be used.”99 
The caveat has two components: on the one hand, it is necessary to ensure 
that the drug will be manufactured and distributed in the first place; on the 
other, even when commercialized, voucher-sped drugs and therapies might 
be priced at levels that generate substantial deadweight loss, and therefore, it 
is also crucial to guarantee affordability of these drugs. Currently, however, 
there is no legal mechanism to prevent pharmaceutical companies from 
setting monopolistic prices for drugs for which they have successfully 
redeemed a voucher. A case in point is Vimizim, the drug for which BioMarin 
received the inaugural pediatric voucher—the same voucher the company 
later transferred to Sanofi and Regeneron for $67 million.100 Vimizim costs 
$380,000 a year per patient, an amount that puts it in the top five of the 
world’s most expensive drugs.101 These numbers do not constitute an isolated 
example. The two drugs for which Alexion was granted tropical disease 
vouchers in 2015, Strensiq (for hypophosphatasia) and Kanuma (for 
lysosomal acid lipase deficiency), have an annual cost of $285,000 and 
$310,000 respectively.102 
There have been proposals to require that pharmaceutical companies 
guarantee affordable access to a drug before a voucher is awarded,103 but the 
recently approved 21st Century Cures Act, which creates a new voucher 
program, is silent on this topic.104 
 
98.  See Ridley et al., supra note 16, at 321. 
99.  Id. 
100.  GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 12. 
101.  See Alex Philippidis, The High Cost of Rare Disease Drugs, GENETIC ENG’G & 
BIOTECH. NEWS (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.genengnews.com/gen-exclusives/the-high-cost-
of-rare-disease-drugs/77900055. Vizimim is expected to generate $400 million to $500 
million in yearly revenue for the BioMarin; see Marvin M. Goldenberg, Pharmaceutical 
Approval Update, 39 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 337, 337–38 (2014). 
102.  Amy Nordrum, Drug Prices: World’s Most Expensive Medicine Costs $440,000 a 
Year, But is it Worth the Expense?, INT’L. BUS. TIMES, (Feb. 13, 2016), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/drug-prices-worlds-most-expensive-medicine-costs-440000-year-it-
worth-expense-2302609. 
103.  See Pécoul & Balasegaram, supra note 92; see Cameron Arnold & Thomas Pogge, 
Improving the Incentives of the FDA Voucher Program for Neglected Tropical Diseases 
(Spring/Summer 2015), https://www.brown.edu/initiatives/journal-world-
affairs/sites/brown.edu.initiatives.journal-world-
affairs/files/private/articles/Arnold%20and%20Pogge.pdf. 
104.  See Arnold & Pogge, supra note 103. 
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III. RECENT EXPANSION OF THE VOUCHER PROGRAM 
A. Expansion of Eligible Tropical Diseases in the Wake of the Ebola and 
Zika Outbreaks 
As described in Part II, the FDA has the authority to expand the list of 
tropical diseases that qualify for priority review vouchers by administrative 
order.105 On two separate occasions, though sharing the same motivation, 
Congress also added Ebola and Zika to the list. First, in December 2014, all 
strains of filoviruses—the family that includes the Ebola virus—were made 
voucher-eligible.106 This was accomplished a short four months after the 
WHO declared the 2014 West Africa Ebola outbreak a public health 
emergency. In April 2016, Congress again expanded the list to include the 
Zika virus, only two months after the WHO declaration of public health 
emergency.107 
The addition of Ebola and Zika to the list of voucher-eligible neglected 
tropical diseases is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it showcases the 
goodwill associated with the voucher program. While Congress disagreed on 
many aspects of the response to Ebola and Zika, delaying funding to address 
both public health emergencies,108 it made each disease eligible for a priority 
review voucher within months of the beginning of each outbreak.109  Second, 
the inclusion of Ebola and Zika in the voucher program offers new evidence 
of the misalignment between the incentives offered by the voucher program 
and their impact on R&D in neglected diseases.110 
For the purposes of the voucher program, Ebola and Zika are treated 
similarly; both are tropical diseases lacking a vaccine111 and endemic to areas 
 
105.  See supra Part II. FDA added Chagas and neurocysticercosis to the list in 2015. See 
Additions to Tropical Diseases, supra note 56, at 50, 559. 
106.  21 U.S.C. § 360n(a)(2). 
107.  Press Release, Kaiser Family Found., House Approves Bipartisan Bill Adding Zika 
To FDA’s Priority Review Voucher Qualifying Diseases List; President Obama Expected 
To Sign (Apr. 13, 2016), http://kff.org/news-summary/house-approves-bipartisan-bill-adding-
zika-to-fdas-priority-review-voucher-qualifying-diseases-list-president-obama-expected-to-
sign/; see also Sarah Ferris, House Approves Bill to Speed Up Zika Drugs, THE HILL (Apr. 12, 
2016), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/276045-house-approves-bill-to-speed-up-drugs-
for-zika-virus. 
108.  See Alison Kodjak, Congress Ends Spat, Agrees to Fund $1.1 Billion to Combat 
Zika, NPR (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2016/09/28/495806979/congress-ends-spat-over-zika-funding-approves-1-1-billion. 
109.  See S.2917 - Adding Ebola to the FDA Priority Review Voucher Program Act, infra 
note 124; see Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 107. 
110.  Kesselheim, supra note 86. 
111.  See WORLD HEALTH ORG., Ebola Virus Disease, 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/ (last updated Jan. 2016); see also 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., Zika Virus, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/zika/en/ (last 
updated Sept. 6, 2016). 
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of the world with unattractive markets for mainstream biopharmaceutical 
R&D.112 However, the viruses’ R&D histories are considerably different. In 
the case of Ebola, as early as 2006, the Department of Homeland Security 
assessed the virus as a “material threat to the U.S. population sufficient to 
affect national security” and the Department of Health and Human Services 
listed Ebola as a high-priority threat.”113 Furthermore, the linkage between 
Ebola and bioterrorism has shaped the institutional makeup of players 
involved in Ebola and filoviruses R&D, and by extension the amount of 
funding. To give but a few examples, ZMapp, a “monoclonal antibody 
cocktail,” was developed through a partnership between the Biomedical 
Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), the National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the Department of 
Defense, and California-based Mapp Biopharmaceutical.114 Several of these 
entities, like BARDA or NIAID, entered multiple partnerships for different 
products. For instance, BARDA also started funding the development and 
manufacture of a recombinant vesicular stomatitis virus vaccine (rVSV) 
against Ebola in late 2014.115 NIAID partnered with GlaxoSmithKline and 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and funded vaccines targeting the 
Zaire and Sudan strains of Ebola.116 
The FDA was involved in the response to the Ebola outbreak and its 
aftermath at different levels,117 from guidance drafting to clinical trials.118 
Notably, the agency issued eleven emergency use authorizations for 
 
112.  See supra Part I. 
113.  See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2015 PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY 
MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES ENTERPRISE (PHEMCE) STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
8, 15, https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/mcm/phemce/Pages/2015-factsheet.aspx (last 
updated Dec. 22, 2015) [hereinafter PHEMCE] (listing Ebola on the high priority threat list of 
the Department of Health and Human Service’s “Public Health Emergency Medical 
Countermeasures Enterprise Strategy and Implementation Plan”). 
114.  Id. 
115.  Id. at 16–17. 
116.  Specifically, the partnership funded a monovalent vaccine (cAd3-EBOZ) targeting 
the Zaire strain of Ebola and a bivalent vaccine (cAd3-EBO) targeting the Zaire and Sudan 
strains of Ebola. NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES, EBOLA: NIAID/GSK 
INVESTIGATIONAL EBOLA VACCINE (CAD3-EBOZ) (Feb. 26, 2016), 
https://www.niaid.nih.gov/diseases-conditions/ebola-vaccines. 
117.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE: EBOLA 
RESPONSE UPDATES FROM FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/EmergencyPreparedness/Counterterrorism/MedicalCountermeasures/uc
m410308.htm (last updated Jan. 30, 2017). 
118.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VACCINES AND RELATED BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS, 
BRIEFING DOCUMENT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING, LICENSURE OF EBOLA 
VACCINES: DEMONSTRATION OF EFFECTIVENESS (May 12, 2015), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/BloodV
accinesandOtherBiologics/VaccinesandRelatedBiologicalProductsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM
445819.pdf. 
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unapproved medical products or unapproved uses of approved medical 
products to be used in Ebola R&D between 2014 and 2016.119 The FDA is 
also co-sponsoring post-outbreak Ebola R&D. In May 2016, the agency 
issued a $3.6 million contract to Stanford University to conduct studies on 
survivors of the outbreak.120 But even with added institutional support arising 
from biosecurity concerns—which Zika lacked—by the time Ebola vaccine 
trials began, the number of reported cases had already began declining121 and, 
as of early 2017, there is no approved vaccine.122 
While the real question is whether the voucher program will be able to 
incentivize future innovation on Ebola, Zika, and similar diseases, it bears 
noting that the partnerships to speed up R&D on Ebola and Zika formed 
before the inclusion of these viruses on the voucher-eligible list.A simple 
look at the chronology of the response to Ebola puts the significance of 
expanding the program to cover Ebola into perspective. The West Africa 
outbreak began in March 2014, but the WHO did not declare it an emergency 
until mid-August.123 Congress added Ebola to the voucher program in 
December 2014.124 Meanwhile, the aforementioned recombinant vaccine 
(rVSV) was licensed to an American pharmaceutical company in 2010, 
received funding by BARDA in 2014-2015, and underwent phase I clinical 
trials from late 2014 to early 2015.125 A bivalent vaccine (cAd3-EBO-Z) was 
developed with partial funding from NIH and the NIAID and entered clinical 
trials in 2014.126 Several other vaccine candidates followed similar 
 
119.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATIONS: 2014 EBOLA VIRUS 
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CMRegulatoryScience/ucm500274.htm (last updated Jan. 31, 2017). 
121.  See Kai Kupferschmidt, Second Ebola Vaccine Trial May Be Too Little, Too Late, 
SCI. MAG. (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/04/second-ebola-vaccine-
trial-may-be-too-little-too-late. 
122.  There is however hope that a vaccine might soon reach the market. See Final Trial 
Results Confirm Ebola Vaccine Provides High Protection Against Disease, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., (Dec. 23, 2016), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2016/ebola-vaccine-
results/en/. 
123.  Media Centre Statement, World Health Org., Statement on the 1st meeting of the 
IHR Emergency Committee on the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa (Aug. 8, 2014), 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/. 
124.  See S.2917 - Adding Ebola to the FDA Priority Review Voucher Program Act; X 
see also Public Law No: 113-233, Dec.16, 2014. 
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ENG. J. MED. 330, 331 (Jan. 26, 2017), 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa1414216#t=article. 
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timelines.127 In all cases, partnerships formed before the tropical disease 
vouchers expanded to cover Ebola and other filoviruses, and economic 
resources mobilized before the voucher incentive. In the future, the sponsor 
who obtains regulatory approval from the FDA to market an Ebola vaccine 
in the United States will be able to collect the voucher reward—either by 
using it to speed up review of another drug or by selling it. 
The impact of the voucher program on Zika is identical, although the R&D 
background is different. Even though the virus was identified in 1947, 
science on Zika is significantly less developed than on Ebola.128 Before 2015, 
Zika “was not considered to be a major pathogen,” but since the outbreak, 
nearly 1,000 scientific publications on the virus have emerged.129 Disease 
complexity is not the only factor that has slowed down R&D in this area. 
While linked to devastating problems like microcephaly, the virus is not 
lethal like Ebola, is not associated with bioterrorism, and before 
popularization of air travel was unlikely to spread in a meaningful way 
outside endemic areas in the developing world.130 
As of early 2017, there are at least 40 entities involved in the development 
of a Zika vaccine.131  Some of these companies were or still are also involved 
in Ebola R&D.132 Additionally, there is federal funding from the 
NIH/NIAID133 and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (Department 
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26 BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, GLOBAL ACCESS IN ACTION (GAiA) (Oct. 14, 
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(discussing the areas on which long-term Zika research is still needed). 
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ZIKA VIRUS, https://www.niaid.nih.gov/diseases-conditions/addressing-zika (last updated Jul. 
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of Defense).134 At the time of writing, clinical trials are underway.135 
Congress added Zika to the list of voucher-eligible diseases in April 
2016.136 As with Ebola, there was no window of time for the voucher program 
to possibly have any bearing on the R&D landscape that generated the current 
vaccine candidates. Yet the program will reward sponsors of Zika vaccines 
for gaining FDA approval. Even so, Congress rushed to approve the inclusion 
of Zika on the tropical disease list—the same Congress that shortly thereafter 
could not agree on funding for the domestic response to Zika, stalling the 
reallocation of Ebola response funds, at a time when the Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) were running out of money to combat the spread of Zika.137 
The expansion of the list of tropical diseases to include Ebola and Zika is 
aligned with the architecture of the voucher program: it opens an additional 
stream of incentives to two traditionally neglected diseases that are endemic 
to markets of limited purchasing power. However, the condensed period of 
time in which funders and innovators came together to enhance R&D on 
Ebola and Zika sheds light on the fact that all resulting biopharmaceutical 
innovation was completely detached from this type of incentives program. 
Instead, that innovation was both hampered by pre-existing market failures 
(like the pre-2015 concentration of Zika cases in neglected markets) and 
driven by pre-existing incentives (like the role of bioterrorism in Ebola R&D 
or the fear factor introduced by the high number of fatalities during the West 
Africa Ebola outbreak and the congenital defects linked with Zika). 
The issue therefore becomes one of assessing whether adding Ebola and 
Zika to the voucher program is likely to encourage future R&D on these 
pathogens. Whereas Ebola will likely maintain the status of high priority 
threat,138 Zika ceased to be considered a public health emergency in 
November 2016.139 Typically, post-emergency funding for outbreak diseases 
decreases quickly.140 While the magnitude of the Zika outbreak will probably 
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sustain interest and moderate funding for R&D for a while, domestic and 
international focus will shift towards the next infectious disease.141 That 
leaves the question of whether the vouchers are sufficiently powerful to 
stimulate additional innovation around Zika and Ebola. As discussed in Part 
IV, the economic footprint of the program appears to be too small to achieve 
that goal.142 
B. The 21st Century Cures Act and Vouchers for Medical 
Countermeasures 
The FDA defines medical countermeasures as “products (biologics, drugs, 
devices) that may be used in the event of a potential public health emergency 
stemming from a terrorist attack with a biological, chemical, or 
radiological/nuclear material, a naturally occurring emerging disease, or a 
natural disaster.”143 The 21st Century Cures Act (“the Act”) creates a third 
type of voucher program covering these products.144 The Act defines a 
“material threat medical countermeasure application” as an application for a 
drug that is intended “to prevent, or treat harm from a biological, chemical, 
radiological, or nuclear agent identified as a material threat;”145 or “to 
mitigate, prevent, or treat harm from a condition that may result in adverse 
health consequences or death and may be caused by administering a drug, or 
biological product against such agent.”146 Similar to the pre-existing 
programs, vouchers for medical countermeasures are transferable, and there 
is no limitation on the number of times they may be sold or otherwise 
transferred.147 Drugs qualifying for the new voucher program may 
cumulatively benefit from “any other incentive programs.”148 A temporal 
limitation applies, however, as the program is scheduled to sunset on October 
1, 2023.149 
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IV. THE FUTURE OF THE PROGRAM 
A. Possible Fixes and Alternatives 
1. Existing Proposals 
Most proposals to reform the voucher program focus on the two problems 
described in Part III. The first is the lack of innovative R&D for diseases that 
qualify for vouchers. In both the nearly decade-long tropical disease program 
and the more recent pediatric program, the preferred modus operandi of 
pharmaceutical companies seeking a voucher has been to avoid engaging in 
costly R&D—the market failure that the vouchers were supposed to 
attenuate—and instead bear the substantially lower costs of bringing existing 
drugs (or versions that do not appear to be more effective) to regulatory 
review. To counter this trend, there have been several calls for the recipient 
of a voucher to be required to reuse part of the voucher money for R&D in 
voucher-eligible diseases, or to “show some level of investment” in R&D 
related to the voucher-qualifying drug.150 The way in which investment 
would be determined—by what metrics and at what stage—remains to be 
described in the literature. Other proposals try to address the question of 
affordability in the context of the voucher program by suggesting that would-
be voucher recipients should be required to agree ex ante to sell the drug at 
affordable prices.151 
A more radical approach would be to recognize that the voucher program 
is indeed failing as an incentives mechanism for R&D in underfunded 
diseases. As currently designed, the program is more likely to result in cross-
subsidization of mainstream diseases than in innovative R&D for pathogens 
like Ebola, Zika or rare pediatric diseases, as illustrated by the analysis of the 
relationship between the addition of Ebola and Zika in the priority review 
voucher program and the formation of Ebola and Zika R&D partnerships 
during the recent outbreaks.152 
Even when considering the prices fetched by the sales of vouchers in 
recent years, and even if the program did not trigger any R&D or affordability 
concerns, it might be that the program will always be too small to truly impact 
allocation of R&D resources within the pharmaceutical industry. As Aaron 
Kesselheim points out: 
The prospect of a payment of as much as $350 million a decade or so in 
the future may nevertheless be insufficient for large pharmaceutical 
manufacturers accustomed to substantially higher revenues to change their 
 
150.  See Kesselheim et al., supra note 86, at 1982. 
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152.  See supra Part III.A. 
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investments to tropical or rare pediatric diseases. For instance, Sanofi, 
which was involved in the purchase of 2 vouchers, reported revenues of 
more than $43 billion in 2014.153 
Against this backdrop, prolonging the life of the voucher program not only 
reinforces the market failures that are left unsolved by the patent system;154 
it also perpetuates a system that is nominally cost-neutral to the FDA but that 
in practice entails resource displacement and affects the agency’s priority-
setting agenda.155 
Nevertheless, political support for the voucher system—rooted in a 
misconstruction of the vouchers as cost-neutral drivers of increased R&D in 
neglected diseases—does not appear to wane. Calls for the program to sunset 
or be cancelled are likely to be futile, as they have been in the past.156 The 
21st Century Cures Act supports this view, as described in the following 
section. Given this scenario, if and when Congress revisits the voucher 
program, it would be critical to at least mitigate the R&D and affordability 
problems triggered by current practices. In particular, a requirement 
establishing that a modicum of the revenue generated by the sale of a voucher 
be redirected towards a voucher-eligible disease would be a first step, and 
potentially not impossible to negotiate from a political standpoint. 
Restrictions on the ability of sponsors to obtain a voucher by gaining FDA 
approval for drugs already commercialized abroad should also be put in 
place, although it might be harder to compromise on these restrictions. 
Finally, making the vouchers conditional on price negotiations guaranteeing 
affordability of drugs would also be desirable, although probably another 
hard sell. 
2. Impact of the 21st Century Cures Act 
The 21st Century Cures Act has been a controversial piece of legislation 
throughout its drafting history, having been dubbed “one of the most-lobbied 
health care bills in recent history, with nearly three lobbyists working for its 
passage or defeat for every lawmaker on Capitol Hill.”157 The Act allocates 
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Frenzy, NPR (Nov. 25, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2016/11/25/503176370/legislation-that-would-shape-fda-and-nih-triggers-lobbying-
frenzy; see also Michael Hiltzik, The 21st Century Cures Act: A Huge Handout to the Drug 
Industry Disguised as a Pro-Research Bounty, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015), 
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over $6 billion to fund medical research, but has drawn extensive criticism 
over provisions that codify long-standing demands of the pharmaceutical 
industry.158 Extensive portions of the Act affect the FDA,159 including the 
process(es) through which the Agency reviews drug applications.160 
As noted above, the Act also has a direct impact on the priority review 
voucher program, namely by creating a new stream for medical 
countermeasures.161 Moreover, the new legislation also makes some strides 
in incorporating mandatory assessment mechanisms for all types of vouchers 
(and not just for pediatric vouchers, as until now), as well as reinforcing the 
idea that the vouchers are supposed to enhance innovation for neglected or 
rare diseases. Section 3014 of the 21st Century Cures Act mandates that GAO 
conduct a study of the multiple priority review voucher programs.162 The 
resulting reports must be submitted to the Committee on Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions of the Senate and to the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce of the House by January 31, 2020.163 Section 3014(c) provides an 
exhaustive list of issues to be addressed by GAO. Among these, it is worth 
highlighting the provision that mandates a determination of “whether, and to 
what extent, the voucher impacted the sponsor’s decision to develop the 
drug.”164 For drugs approved under the neglected tropical disease program, 
the proposed legislation mandates a determination of whether the approval 
or licensure of the drug addresses “global unmet needs” in the prevention or 
treatment of tropical diseases.165 And, similarly for the rare pediatric diseases 
voucher program, the report must present a determination of whether the 
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approval or licensure of the drug addressed an “unmet need.”166 If a priority 
review voucher for medical countermeasures is approved, a similar 
determination needs to be made, assessing whether approval or licensure of 
a drug “affected the Nation’s preparedness against a chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear threat, including naturally occurring threats.”167 The 
Act further emphasizes the need by establishing a separate requirement that 
the GAO report assess “whether any improvements to such programs are 
necessary to appropriately target incentives for the development of drugs that 
would likely not otherwise be developed, or developed in as timely a 
manner.”168 Collectively, these requirements are more stringent than the ones 
that were in place after the GAO’s study of the pediatric voucher program.169 
Catering to the concerns periodically voiced by the FDA about the impact 
of the voucher programs on its resources, the Act also mandates an evaluation 
of “the resources used by the Food and Drug Administration in reviewing 
drugs for which vouchers were used, including the effect of the programs on 
the Food and Drug Administration’s review of drugs for which priority 
review vouchers were not awarded or used.”170 
While the 21st Century Cures Act does nothing to directly address the two 
main problems associated with the vouchers—lack of R&D on neglected 
diseases and affordability—it does provide a better normative framework for 
evaluating the successes and failures of the program as an incentives 
mechanism. This modest improvement should facilitate informed debate 
about the merits of the program in years to come. 
B. Revisiting the role of FDA as a locus for incentives policy 
In addition to issues that are intrinsic to the awarding and use of the 
vouchers, Congress’ use of an agency like the FDA as tool for innovation 
policy raises further questions. The FDA has a storied role in pharmaceutical 
innovation, but one that is primarily associated with its mission as a 
gatekeeper: the main focus of the agency is to ensure that drugs are safe and 
effective, a role that is undeniably shaped by underlying policy choices. As 
Peter Barton Hutt has written, it “is difficult to find any significant issue faced 
by FDA that is not ultimately a matter of policy, informed by both scientific 
and legal considerations.”171 
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In addition to its gatekeeping function, the FDA also has explicit and 
implicit roles in innovation policy, as demonstrated by Rebecca Eisenberg.172 
For example, FDA regulation has become “an important adjunct to the patent 
system in protecting innovating firms from competition in product 
markets.”173 The types of market exclusivity that FDA regulation layers on 
top (or, in some cases, in lieu of) patent rights directly impacts decision-
making processes in the pharmaceutical industry, particularly at the level of 
funding and R&D strategies. 
But while the combined roles played by the FDA may and do effectively 
shape the types of pharmaceutical innovation that we get,174 never has the 
agency been called to partake in an incentives scheme as it does under the 
voucher program. It is one thing to acknowledge that FDA regulation and 
rulemaking is informed by policy and will, which in turn affect industry 
behavior; it is another to use agency review as an integral component of the 
economic incentive. 
As described in Ridley’s 2006 paper and subsequently implemented, the 
program purports to have no impact on the Agency because it is cost-
neutral—that is, the economic cost of resource displacement is absorbed by 
the fee paid by drug sponsors wishing to redeem the voucher. Moreover, the 
90-day notification requirement ensures that the agency will have the time 
necessary to adjust to an expedited timeline.175 Yet a simple budgetary 
balancing act does not truly depict the extent of the impact of the voucher 
program on the agency, which has been vocal about not endorsing the 
vouchers.176 The GAO Report, albeit focused solely on pediatric vouchers, 
made the agency’s position abundantly clear: 
FDA officials stated that, while they strongly support the goal of 
incentivizing drug development for rare pediatric diseases, they have seen 
no evidence that the program is effective. The program’s authorization, as 
amended, is set to terminate October 1, 2016, and FDA officials said they 
do not support the program’s continuation. They expressed concern that 
the program adversely affects the agency’s ability to set its public health 
priorities by requiring FDA to provide priority reviews of new drug 
applications that would not otherwise qualify if they do not treat a serious 
condition or provide a significant improvement in safety or effectiveness. 
Additionally, FDA officials said that the additional workload from the 
program strains the agency’s resources.177 
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As the 21st Century Cures Act is implemented, the FDA will continue to 
be part of an incentives scheme that the Agency finds contrary to its mission. 
The impact and consequences of allowing private parties to influence Agency 
goal setting has yet to be fully addressed in the literature and raises questions 
that exceed the scope of the Article. Nevertheless, as new vouchers are 
granted and redeemed, this is an area that deserves close monitoring. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although Congress acted with good intentions, the efficacy of the program 
is questionable. GAO’s evaluation of the pediatric voucher program was 
inconclusive, but evidence seems to suggest that most, if not all, drugs that 
have received a voucher were already in development before each of the 
voucher categories was implemented. In this sense, the incentive provided by 
the vouchers is perversely diverted towards areas where there are fewer, if 
any, shortages of R&D incentives. The current design of the program also 
fails to ensure that drugs for which a voucher is redeemed are available to 
patients at affordable prices. 
Despite these shortcomings, the recent additions of filoviruses and Zika to 
the list of voucher-eligible diseases, as well of the expansion of the program 
to cover medical countermeasures, indicate that Congressional support for 
the vouchers will likely endure. The 21st Century Cures Act is poised to 
improve the parameters for evaluation of the program in future GAO reports, 
but does little to solve the incentives problem at the core of the voucher 
mechanism, or to address its affordability issues. 
Finally, while it has been widely documented that current incentives for 
R&D in low-burden diseases are subpar, co-involving the FDA in 
experiments with alternative incentives models is not without its risks. The 
program displaces Agency resources, arguably impacting the Agency’s 
overall implicit and explicit innovation policies. It also brings into question 
whether the FDA is the best locus for anchoring prize-type incentives, even 
in indirect forms such as the voucher program. 
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school and sit for the bar examination.  Now, through an affiliation with Concord Law School, this unique 
degree offering is now available exclusively online to any health care professional in the world who wants 
to study health law.  Our MJ classes are taught by law professors, practicing health lawyers, and health 
care professionals who have first-hand experience with the issues that affect caregivers, administrators, 
and patients every day.  Subjects include informed consent, Medicare reimbursement, right-to-die 
questions and access to health care. 
 
For More Information 
 
Beazley Institute for Health Law and Policy 
Loyola University Chicago School of Law 
25 East Pearson Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60611 
Telephone: 312.915.7174   Fax: 312.915.6212 
Email: health-law@luc.edu  On the web: LUC.edu/healthlaw 
